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Notes 
Consumption by Destination: 
The Practical Aspects of Adopting the 
Destination Principle 
Gerald A. Byrnes* 
Corporate tax reform has been a “hot button” tax issue for numerous years now. The 
complex and inefficient double taxation model has proven to be particularly ill equipped 
to properly tax large multinational entities. One popular idea to solve these concerns is to 
switch to a consumption tax. However, there are still questions about how to model said 
tax, particularly in the international context: should a country tax be based on where 
products are destined for, or on where they originate? This Note focuses on the practical 
appeal of preferring the destination principle to the origin principle, should the United 
States adopt a corporate consumption tax. The practical benefits include aligning with 
international standards, facilitating corporate tax compliance in moving to the new 
system, preventing base erosion, and addressing complex tax issues such as the treatment 
of intellectual property across international lines. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of California Hastings College of the Law. B.A., 2010, University 
of California at Santa Barbara. I would like to thank Professor Noël Cunningham for the inspiration of 
this topic and Dean Heather Field for her guidance on this Note. I would also like to thank the editors of 
the Hastings Law Journal for helping to make this Note much better than I could on my own. This Note is 
dedicated to my parents for their unwavering support throughout law school. 
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Introduction 
Very few doubt that the U.S. tax system needs an overhaul. An old 
and outmoded system, our current income tax model is inefficient, overly 
complicated, and stifles economic growth in the United States. These 
critiques have only grown as our economy has become more international, 
allowing for an increased flow of goods, services, and capital across 
international boundaries. Moreover, multinational companies have taken 
advantage of this increased globalization—and the different tax rules of 
other countries—to exploit gaps in competing tax codes and create less 
than “single” taxation. This problem has been well documented,1 but 
scholars cannot agree on the best solution to address the issue. 
One well-known reform idea is to change the U.S. tax system, in 
whole or in part, from an income tax to a consumption tax. A consumption 
tax taxes “consumption,” or spending, as opposed to the attainment of 
wealth. Scholars have propounded several different models of a 
consumption tax,2 all of which are aimed at addressing issues within the 
current system, including: corporate double taxation, the different 
treatment of debt versus equity, and how corporations have used their 
multinational status purely to achieve tax benefits that lack justification 
in economic reality. 
 
 1. See, e.g., Ian Pollock, Corporation Tax: Easy for Multinationals to Avoid?, BBC News (Apr. 5, 
2012, 10:38 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-17625874. 
 2. See generally Daniel N. Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax, 
103 Tax Notes 91 (2004) (explaining the various types of progressive consumption taxes).  
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One critical component of a consumption tax that changes from 
iteration to iteration is whether to tax on a “destination” or “origin” 
principle. Although both tend to lead to the same result in the long run, 
at least economically, the destination principle has been featured more 
prominently, both in scholarly articles and in real-world implementations.3 
When considering how to implement a consumption tax, U.S. tax 
reformers have focused on the destination principle because, practically 
speaking, it is an easier system to implement and is also able to achieve 
the goals that make a consumption tax desirable. 
In Part I, this Note discusses the background of corporate and 
international taxation in the United States. Part II presents the various 
problems that have arisen in our current tax system, including issues 
faced by U.S. businesses competing in international markets, the 
pandemic of business flight and inversions, and the establishment of 
offshore tax havens. Part III argues the merits of adopting the 
destination principle, assuming the United States adopts a corporate 
consumption tax. These merits are largely based upon the practical 
advantages of the destination principle: most major trading partners of 
the United States have already adopted it; it is largely analogous to 
current de facto territoriality; it combats tax base erosion; and it best 
resolves difficult tax issues, exemplified by the taxation of intellectual 
property. Finally, Part IV responds to two of the main critiques of the 
destination principle: its effect on current tax revenue and its 
disadvantages when compared to the origin principle. 
I.  Contemporary U.S. Taxation of Domestic Corporations 
As a general proposition, U.S. corporations are treated as distinct 
taxpayers, separate from their shareholders.4 The United States currently 
taxes domestic corporations upon the corporation’s worldwide income.5 
Thus, the corporation is taxed any time it acquires wealth, irrespective of 
the transaction that leads to that wealth. This has helped, at least in part, 
generate an overly complicated tax system because the U.S. tax system 
must account for how foreign tax systems might tax the same item of 
 
 3. See, e.g., Noël B. Cunningham & Mitchell L. Engler, Prescription for Corporate Income Tax 
Reform: A Corporate Consumption Tax, 66 Tax L. Rev. 445, 452 (2013). In arguing for the benefits of 
the destination principle, this Note presumes that most countries have adopted the destination principle, 
which is currently true. However, should more countries adopt the origin principle for their tax system, 
some of these benefits would be undermined. For example, double taxation would occur if a company 
was manufacturing goods in Country A (with the origin principle) for consumption in Country B (with 
the destination principle).  
 4. Corporations, Internal Revenue Serv., http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-
Self-Employed/Corporations (last updated Nov. 12, 2014). 
 5. I.R.C. § 11 (West 2015). 
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income.6 Preventing double taxation of income is one of the core norms 
of international taxation, and is usually accomplished through bilateral 
tax treaties.7 According to the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”), 
the United States currently has one of the highest statutory corporate tax 
rates—39.3 percent—in the entire Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (“OECD”), surpassed only by Germany and Japan.8 
A corporation’s foreign-sourced passive income is taxed immediately, 
while nonpassive income earned from foreign sources is taxed when the 
corporation “repatriates” the income.9 This worldwide taxation differs 
remarkably from the territorial taxation system that most developed 
countries use.10 Under a territorial taxation system, the taxing government 
only includes the income from that territory in the tax base; income from 
foreign sources is simply excluded.11 In contrast to a territorial tax 
system, the United States has jurisdiction to tax all areas where U.S. 
citizens or resident aliens earn income worldwide, as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court.12 
This worldwide posture, however, is mitigated by provisions of 
current U.S. tax law. Under sections 901–909 of the Internal Revenue 
Code (“IRC”), taxpayers are allowed a credit against their U.S. income 
tax for the foreign income tax they paid on a particular item of income.13 
In a nod to international comity, and to prevent double taxation, the 
United States allows foreign governments the first crack at taxation. This 
credit is the logical result of a tax system that acknowledges that active 
 
 6. Tax Reform, H. Comm. on Ways & Means, http://tax.house.gov (last visited June 9, 2015) 
(describing generally the broad economic benefits that would result from simplification of the current 
U.S. tax system); Tax Reform Option Papers, Senate Comm. on Finance, http://www.finance.senate.gov/ 
issue/?id=6c61b1e9-7203-4af0-b356-357388612063 (last visited June 9, 2015) (describing the complicated 
rules that apply to U.S. taxpayers who earn money from foreign sources). Both chambers have identified 
a complicated U.S. tax code in need of reform. 
 7. See generally Klaus Vogel, Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation, 4 Int’l Tax & Bus. 
Law. 1, 10–13 (1986). 
 8. Cong. Budget Office, Corporate Income Tax Rates: International Comparisons 14–15 (2005). 
 9. “Passive income” refers generally to income earned from sources that do not require active 
participation. See I.R.C. § 469 (West 2015) (providing the statutory definition of passive income). 
“Repatriate” refers to when the corporation brings foreign income into the domestic United States. John 
Barrasso, Territorial v. Worldwide Taxation, Senate Republican Pol’y Comm. (Sept. 19, 2012), 
http://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/territorial-vs-worldwide-taxation; Kitty Richards & John Craig, 
Offshore Corporate Profits: The Only Thing ‘Trapped’ Is Tax Revenue, Ctr. for Am. Progress (Jan. 9, 
2014), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/tax-reform/report/2014/01/09/81681/offshore-corporate-
profits-the-only-thing-trapped-is-tax-revenue. 
 10. Barrasso, supra note 9.  
 11. Territorial Tax System, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/t/territorial-tax-
system (last visited June 9, 2015) (defining territorial tax system). 
 12. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924) (finding Congress had the power to tax income of nonresident 
citizens from property not situated within the United States). 
 13. I.R.C. §§ 901–09 (West 2015). 
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income should be “sourced” (and thus taxed) where it is earned.14 If the 
FTC is fully applicable against U.S. taxation, the result is that the 
corporation only needs to pay foreign tax on foreign income and no U.S. 
tax, creating a de facto territoriality taxation system.15 This de facto 
territoriality helps ensure that international taxpayers are subjected to 
the lowest amount of double taxation possible.16 
II.   Consequences of the Current System 
What may have once been a workable system has proven to be 
inefficient and burdensome in light of the increased globalization of the 
twenty-first century. Globalization has increased international trade, 
manufacturing, and financing. As nations develop and become more 
capable of providing these services, the United States has been held back 
by its current form of international corporate taxation and relatively high 
corporate taxation rate.17 
A. Lack of International Competitiveness 
One of the biggest concerns of U.S. tax policymakers is that the 
worldwide taxation of U.S. companies hinders their ability to compete 
with international companies abroad.18 This is partly due to the fact that 
the U.S. corporate tax rate remains relatively high,19 as compared to the 
rest of the global economy. According to at least one scholar, “[p]artly in 
response to the increased openness of economies, corporate tax rates 
have trended downwards abroad.”20 Developing countries have lowered 
tax rates in order to both increase the competitiveness of their domestic 
corporations at home and to attract foreign companies looking to 
relocate.21 As a consequence, U.S. companies paying U.S. taxation are 
often forced to pay more in taxes than their foreign counterparts on the 
same income, and 
 
 14. Donald J. Rousslang, Foreign Tax Credit, Tax Pol’y Ctr., http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/ 
taxtopics/encyclopedia/Foreign-Tax-Credit.cfm (last visited June 9, 2015). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., Articles of the Model Convention with Respect 
to Taxes on Income and on Capital, art. 23 (Jan. 28, 2003). 
 17. Charles Scaliger, Major U.S. Companies Park Money Overseas to Save on Taxes, New Am. 
(Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.thenewamerican.com/economy/sectors/item/14765-major-u-s-companies-park-
money-overseas-to-save-on-taxes. 
 18. Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Gordon Gray, Heritage Found., Global Competitiveness and the 
Corporation Income Tax (Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/04/global-
competitiveness-and-the-corporation-income-tax. 
 19. Id.; see also Alan J. Auerbach, Ctr. for Am. Progress, A Modern Corporate Tax 2 (2010). 
 20. Auerbach, supra note 19, at 5. 
 21. S.M. Ali Abbas & Alexander Klemm, Int’l Monetary Fund, A Partial Race to the Bottom: 
Corporate Tax Developments in Emerging and Developing Economies 21 (2012); Auerbach, supra 
note 19, at 5. 
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[w]ith top combined state and federal corporate tax rates at about 40 
percent, the United States—once the ‘land of opportunity’ and of free-
market enterprise—now has the highest corporate tax rate in the 
developed world, and a federal government frantically looking for further 
corporate tax ‘loopholes’ to close that will raise rates higher still.22 
For example, consider the situation where U.S. Corp. earns $100 in a 
hypothetical country, subject to U.S. taxation of thirty-five percent, as 
compared to Foreign Corp., which earns $100 in the same hypothetical 
country subject to taxation of twenty percent. On these facts, Foreign 
Corp. would pay $20 to its nation’s taxing authority, while U.S. Corp. 
would pay $35—$20 to the hypothetical country, which would generate a 
$20 FTC that brings the U.S. tax liability down to $15. Thus, U.S. Corp. 
ends up with $15 less to reinvest in its foreign business than Foreign 
Corp. does. 
These concerns about competitiveness are felt by both businesspersons 
and politicians, on both sides of the political line. David Cote, the CEO 
of Honeywell, has said that the shareholder level tax was appropriate, 
but that taxing “the companies that are in the middle of trying to 
compete with new and growing firms” would be a huge mistake.23 
Proponents of the worldwide taxation approach counter that if the 
United States does not tax on a worldwide basis, companies will still be 
incentivized to move their profits and capital away from the United 
States because of the increased tax benefits.24 Both the House Ways and 
Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee have issued reports 
identifying the anticompetitive impact of U.S. tax policy that U.S. 
corporations face while operating abroad.25 In February 2014, the House 
Ways and Means Committee published a legislative discussion draft 
involving an extensive overhaul of the tax system, including the U.S. 
treatment of corporations.26 At the very least, it is clear that tax reform is 
 
 22. Scaliger, supra note 17. 
 23. Ernest Scheyder, Honeywell CEO Urges Sharply Lower U.S. Corporate Tax Rate, Reuters, 
Nov. 21, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/21/us-honeywell-cote-idUSBRE9AK1AT20131121. 
 24. Auerbach, supra note 19, at 10. 
 25. Press Release, House Comm. on Ways and Means, Camp Releases International Tax Reform 
Plan to Strengthen the Economy and Make the Tax Code Simpler, Fairer and Flatter (Feb. 26, 2014), 
available at www.waysandmeans.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=370987; International 
Competitiveness, Senate Comm. on Finance, http://www.finance.senate.gov/issue/?id=0587e4b4-9f98-
4a70-85b0-0033c4f14883 (last visited June 9, 2015). 
 26. See House Comm. on Ways & Means, Ways and Means, 112th Cong., 1st Sess., Discussion 
Draft Bill to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to Provide for Comprehensive Income 
Tax Reform (Feb. 21, 2014), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/statutory_text_ 
tax_reform_act_of_2014_discussion_draft__022614.pdf; Bernie Becker & Kevin Bogardus, Baucus Puts 
Nail in Tax Reform Coffin, Hill (Dec. 20, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/ 
domestic-taxes/193712-tax-reform-even-less-likely-if-baucus-becomes-ambassador-to (explaining how 
former Sen. Baucus, now U.S. Ambassador to China, attempted to push through tax reform, but left 
office before it could be accomplished). 
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a concern taken seriously by both major political groups in the U.S. 
government. 
B. Business Flight 
The current corporate tax system has also had the unintended effect 
of spurring many U.S. corporations to reincorporate or move abroad. 
Many corporations have argued that the only relief from high U.S. rates 
is to re-designate as a foreign company abroad.27 While the process to 
reincorporate can itself be a substantial cost, the drop in effective tax 
rates is often a sufficient benefit to ameliorate the sting.28 For example, 
Applied Materials’ move abroad dropped its effective tax rate from 
twenty-two to seventeen percent, which would result in a tax savings of 
$100 million for that year.29 
Congress has actively tried to respond to business flight by 
increasing taxes when companies attempt to reincorporate abroad. In 
2004, for example, Congress passed section 4985 of the IRC, which 
“imposes a special tax of 15 percent on restricted stock and options held 
by the most senior executives when a company reincorporates outside 
the United States.”30 Other measures aim to prevent this flight by 
continuing to treat expatriated companies as domestic, despite 
reincorporation.31 Such punitive measures, however, have proven largely 
unsuccessful.32 Even following the passage of section 4985, major U.S. 
companies like Omnicom Group, Inc., Applied Materials, Inc., and 
others have reincorporated in lower-tax nations.33 The companies will 
either structure the reincorporation to lessen the tax burden on their 
executives, or simply foot the tax bill as a cost of doing business.34 
Undoubtedly, these expenditures will be worth the long-term tax savings 
to these corporations, as the United States is ill-equipped to deal with 
this fact because “the basic outlines of the U.S. corporate-tax system are 
little-changed since the Kennedy years, when America didn’t have to 
worry about attracting and keeping business.”35 Unfortunately, 
globalization has eroded the economic foundations that lead to the 
 
 27. John D. McKinnon & Scott Thurm, Business and Taxes: U.S. Firms Move Abroad—Despite ’04 
Law, Companies Reincorporate Overseas, Saving Big Sums on Taxes, Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 2012, at B.1. 
 28. Zachary Mider, Companies Fleeing Taxes Pay CEOs Extra as Law Backfires, Bloomberg (Jan. 26, 
2014, 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-27/companies-fleeing-taxes-pay-ceos-extra-as-
law-backfires.html. 
 29. David Gelles, New Corporate Tax Shelter: A Merger Abroad, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 2013, at B.1. 
 30. Mider, supra note 28; see also I.R.C. § 4985 (West 2015). 
 31. I.R.C. § 7874 (West 2015). 
 32. See Mider, supra note 28. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. John D. McKinnon, Lower-Tax Shores Draw U.S. Firms, Wall St. J., June 24, 2011, at B.1. 
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economic preeminence that the United States enjoyed, and the United 
States will have to be more responsive to the course of global economics. 
C. The Rise of the “Tax Haven” 
In addition to business flight, the excessively high tax rate on a U.S. 
corporation’s worldwide income is also demonstrated by the increasingly 
complex ways these companies mitigate and reduce their U.S. tax 
liability—mainly through the use of “tax havens.”36 First, companies can 
plan to have their income flow through holding companies in countries 
with low tax rates.37 Through careful structuring abroad, the company can 
even achieve the desired goal of paying no foreign taxes.38 While the 
corporation cannot avail itself of the domestic FTC in this situation, the 
corporation will not face domestic taxation until they repatriate the 
earnings back to the United States.39 By keeping their earnings abroad, 
companies can take advantage of the time-value of that money, and the 
United States is denied that value until the money is repatriated.40 
One of the most illustrative examples of the complexity involved in 
reducing tax liability is Apple Inc.41 Apple directs its foreign sales, or 
sixty percent of its profits, through Irish subsidiaries—Ireland being a 
well-known tax haven.42 Through special local residence rules, Apple is 
allowed to declare itself as located nowhere—and hence, if there is no 
residence, there is no jurisdiction to tax.43 Additionally, under U.S. 
Treasury Regulations, Apple has the option to “check the box” and have 
its foreign subsidiaries be treated as pass-through entities for U.S. tax 
purposes, rather than being treated as independent corporations that 
must recognize income and pay taxes.44 Such a structure saved Apple at 
least $44 billion in U.S taxes from 2010 to 2013.45 Apple’s smart 
accounting tricks have saved it billions in tax revenue, and it is hardly 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Lee Sheppard, How Does Apple Avoid Taxes?, Forbes (May 28, 2013, 7:46 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/leesheppard/2013/05/28/how-does-apple-avoid-taxes. 
 38. Scott Thurm & Kate Linebaugh, More Profits Parked Offshore, Wall St. J., Mar. 11, 2013, at B.1. 
 39. Richard Rubin, Baucus Proposes Minimum U.S. Tax on Foreign Earnings, Bloomberg (Nov. 19, 
2013, 2:08 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-19/baucus-proposes-minimum-u-s-tax-on-foreign-
earnings.html. 
 40. William Baldwin, Making Tax Deferral Pay Off, Forbes (May 19, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/baldwin/2011/05/19/making-tax-deferral-pay-off. 
 41. See Sheppard, supra note 37. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Howard Gleckman, The Real Story on Apple’s Tax Avoidance: How Ordinary It Is, Forbes 
(May 21, 2013, 4:58 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2013/05/21/the-real-story-about-apples-tax-
avoidance-how-ordinary-it-is/. 
 45. See Sheppard, supra note 37. 
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alone: many U.S.-based multinational companies have adopted similar 
strategies to create elaborate tax havens.46 
Together, these issues underscore the substantial concerns created 
by the current tax regime in the United States. The overall failure of 
measures to halt the emigration of U.S. companies to foreign countries 
should be taken as a sign that punitive methods do not work, at least not 
without resulting in major losses to domestic tax revenue. As political 
discussions have recently acknowledged, the appropriate solution is to 
revamp the current system of taxation and recognize the issues that 
plague U.S. businesses trying to establish an international presence.47 
III.  Reform: A Consumption Tax Based on a DESTINATION Principle 
One of the most prominent alternative methods put forward by 
proponents of tax reform is to replace the corporate income tax with a 
corporate consumption tax. Essentially, a consumption tax taxes the 
taxpayer’s spending or consumption rather than taxing accessions to 
wealth.48 There are several variations of a consumption tax—ranging 
from a sales tax to the Value Added Tax commonly used throughout 
Europe.49 Both sides of the aisle support the adoption of a consumption 
tax in the United States because it is revenue neutral and, in the 
corporate context, has the potential to mitigate double taxation. 
This Note focuses on one aspect of the consumption tax that varies 
from model to application: whether the consumption tax will be based on 
an “origins” principle or a “destination” principle. Under the origins 
principle, the “tax is ultimately levied only on production . . . the key 
difference between the two is that imports must be brought into tax 
under the destination principle (so far as they contribute to consumption) 
and exports ultimately must be excluded, and conversely under the origin 
principle.”50 To illustrate, consider the following example: Suppose a 
corporation in Country A manufactured and sold widgets both at home 
and internationally in Country B. If the taxing authority of Country A 
incorporates the destination principle in its consumption tax, then the 
 
 46. Move Over, Apple: 16 More U.S. Companies Stashing Billions Overseas, Daily Fin. (July 3, 2013, 
10:34 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2013/05/22/tax-dodging-us-companies-billions-overseas. 
 47. John Lechleiter, To Guarantee the U.S.’s Economic Future, We Need Tax Reform Now, Forbes 
(Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlechleiter/2014/01/15/to-guarantee-the-u-s-s-economic-
future-we-need-tax-reform-now. 
 48. Al Ehrbar, Consumption Tax, Concise Encyclopedia of Econ. (2007), http://www.econlib.org/ 
library/Enc/ConsumptionTax.html. 
 49. John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in 
the United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 2095, 2109 
(2000) (“[A consumption tax] is a tax on a base that consists of ‘consumption’ (somehow defined), 
regardless of the tax rate, rates, or rate system used.”). 
 50. Michael Keen & Walter Hellerstein, Interjurisdictional Issues in the Design of a VAT, 63 Tax 
L. Rev. 359, 360 (2010). 
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revenue from the goods bound for Country B would not be included in 
the corporation’s taxable income for Country A. Rather, Country B 
would have the right to include that revenue in the corporation’s taxable 
income, assuming Country B also relied upon a similar tax system. 
The destination principle is often achieved by assigning a “zero 
rate” to exports—essentially, to exclude them from the tax base—and to 
assign a positive rate to imports.51 If the product is to be used within the 
taxing authority’s territory, then it is subject to the authority’s 
jurisdiction to tax. In the words of the OECD, “[t]he application of the 
destination principle achieves neutrality in international trade and would 
improve efficiency.”52 Under the destination principle,  
the corporate tax would be assessed based on where a corporation’s 
products are used rather than where the corporation is located or 
where the goods are produced. Assessing the tax based on where a 
firm’s products are used eliminates issues of where to locate a business 
and incentives for U.S.-domiciled businesses to shift profits abroad to 
reduce U.S. taxes.53 
Assuming that the United States adopts a corporate consumption 
tax, it would be better served to implement the destination principle 
because this principle helps achieve what is most appealing about a 
consumption tax: the prevention of tax base erosion and profit shifting. 
As will be discussed, this principle helps achieve these two goals in a 
practical manner: the United States would conform with international 
norms for taxation; companies could easily switch to this system; profit 
shifting could be easily prevented through careful definitions; and taxing 
authorities could more easily tackle complex tax issues, such as the 
taxation of intellectual property used internationally. 
A. International Comity 
If the United States decides to adopt a corporate-level consumption 
tax, it would do well to base it on the destination principle. First, a 
destination principle would closely mirror the de facto territoriality 
taxation that is the current U.S. norm. Under the current FTC rules, the 
United States cedes the proverbial “first bite” of the apple to a foreign 
authority, but it retains the right to tax income that the foreign authority 
does not tax.54 Adopting a destination principle mirrors the current 
approach: as the foreign authority currently taxes income earned abroad, 
this principle cedes the authority to tax goods bound for that jurisdiction. 
 
 51. Bert Mesdom, VAT and Cross-Border Trade: Do Border Adjustments Make VAT a Fair Tax?, 
in The VAT Reader: What a Federal Consumption Tax Would Mean for America 192, 197 (2011). 
 52. Naoki Oka, Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., Taxing Cross-Border Supply of 
Services and Intangibles 1 (2013). 
 53. Auerbach, supra note 19, at 3. 
 54. I.R.C. §§ 901–09 (West 2015). 
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However, a “pure” territoriality system embraces more closely the ethos 
of international comity, whereas the FTC is merely a nod to that comity. 
By adopting the destination principle, the United States would not retain 
the right to tax spending on items destined offshore, which would 
eliminate the need for FTCs in the first place, as there would be no 
potential for double taxation.55 
Consider the following example: In Country X, domestic company 
A and foreign company B are both subject to the same taxation if they 
wish to do business in X (assuming that B’s home country is one that has 
adopted a destination principle too). X will have the jurisdiction to tax 
both A and B, and B will not suffer any double taxation. As B’s home 
country will have no basis to tax B’s activities in X, B’s home country 
does not need to develop a system of FTCs to mirror this result. 
As far as an international standard can be determined, “[t]he 
destination principle—and with revenue accruing to the country of 
import—is the norm in international trade, and sanctioned by World 
Trade Organization (‘WTO’) rules.”56 Indeed, one of the biggest 
proponents of the destination principle is the OECD, which has 
published a set of draft guidelines addressing how to implement a 
consumption tax in an international context.57 In the words of the OECD, 
“the destination principle places all firms competing in a given 
jurisdiction on an even footing.”58 This has the effect of achieving 
neutrality in international trade.59 These guidelines feature two core 
concepts: (1) the notion that a consumption tax should be neutral for 
business, and (2) the destination principle itself. Many member countries 
of the OECD are prominent U.S. trading partners, and thus, have 
similarly adopted the destination principle and eliminated unnecessary 
international competition.60 By continuing to follow an income tax 
system, the United States continues to hinder its ability to compete in the 
global economy. 
B. Facilitating Corporate Compliance 
The importance of adopting a consumption tax system that is 
functionally similar to our current income system cannot be understated. 
In 2012, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) estimated that based on 
 
 55. William B. Barker, International Tax Reform Should Begin at Home: Replace the Corporate 
Income Tax with a Territorial Expenditure Tax, 30 Nw. J. Intl L. & Bus. 647, 691 (2010). 
 56. See Keen & Hellerstein, supra note 50, at 361–62. 
 57. Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., OECD International VAT/GST Guidelines 12 
(2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/consumption/ConsolidatedGuidelines20130131.pdf. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. List of OECD Member Countries—Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, Org. for Econ. 
Cooperation and Dev., http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member-countries.htm 
(last visited June 9, 2015). 
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costs for filing 2009 federal income tax returns, U.S. businesses spent 
$110 billion in tax compliance each year.61 While certain provisions of the 
IRC allow deductions for tax preparation expenses, the amount is still 
significant.62 Any attempt to adopt a consumption tax in the United 
States should strive to implement a familiar system, lest it force domestic 
corporations to spend billions complying with an unfamiliar system. 
Many current tax reform proposals address the overarching problem 
of a confusing and complicated tax system. Adopting a basis for taxation 
that differs substantially from the current system would undoubtedly 
generate increased compliance costs, at least initially. If the goal of tax 
reform is to make compliance easier both to achieve and to understand, 
such an adoption is surely counterintuitive. Such a move is particularly 
illogical if the goal of reform is to facilitate one’s ability to understand 
how one is being taxed. 
Indeed, David Camp, the Republican chairman of the Ways and 
Means Committee, endorsed the switch to a territorial taxation system as 
part of larger attempt to untangle the current tax compliance system.63 
Rep. Camp encouraged this particular reform in the hopes of easing the 
repatriation of international profits while encouraging businesses to not 
move abroad.64 However, Rep. Camp wished to leave the current 
corporate tax system as one that taxes income rather than consumption.65 
Still, his concern is valid: the move to a system that excludes foreign 
jurisdictions from the tax base would ease compliance efforts for 
companies. This ease is certainly a factor that members of Congress can 
and should account for. As reported, “[t]he nonpartisan joint committee 
on taxation reckons Rep. Camp’s plan favours neither rich nor poor 
relative to the current system.”66 Further, an independent study of Rep. 
Camp’s draft “suggests that implementing the proposals of the Camp 
discussion draft would have positive net effects on the macroeconomic 
performance of the economy.”67 The overall results of the study indicated 
that Rep. Camp’s draft reform would result in an overall increase in 
gross domestic product (“GDP”), both in the short term and long term.68 
While this is somewhat inapposite given that the Camp draft still 
 
 61. George Contos et al., Internal Revenue Serv., Taxpayer Compliance Costs for 
Corporations and Partnerships: A New Look 7, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/ 
12rescontaxpaycompliance.pdf. 
 62. 26 C.F.R. § 1.212-1(l) (2015) (allowing expenses paid in connection with preparing the tax 
return to be deducted for an individual). 
 63. Reforming Taxes: Here’s a Plan, Economist, Mar. 1, 2014, at 30. 
 64. Id. 
 65. John W. Diamond & George R. Zodrow, Tax Policy Advisers LLC, Dynamic Macroeconomic 
Estimates of the Effects of Chairman Camp’s 2014 Tax Reform Discussion Draft (2014). 
 66. Reforming Taxes: Here’s a Plan, supra note 63. 
 67. Diamond & Zodrow, supra note 65, at 2. 
 68. Id. at 9. 
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retained an income-based approach to taxation for corporations, it does 
suggest that the move to a territorial system (referred to as a 
“participation exemption system”69 in the independent study), as part of 
a larger set of tax reforms, could help contribute to overall economic 
improvement. Identifying the “destination principle” as the consumption-
tax analog of a territorial system, one can then see that adopting the 
destination principle for tax reform leads to the same result.  
C. Shifting Profits Abroad 
Adopting a destination principle could prevent profit shifting. Profit 
shifting, at its simplest, occurs when multinational companies shift their 
profits to low tax jurisdictions.70 Corporations often accomplish profit 
shifting by attributing profits to different jurisdictions and setting prices 
between associated entities—multinational enterprises ensure that they 
set up branches in low-tax jurisdictions for this very reason.71 This profit 
shifting, or base erosion, seriously undermines the tax base, causing 
losses in revenue due to exploitation of a regime’s international tax 
system. 
The destination principle addresses this problematic price shifting 
by simply removing exports from the tax base, thereby eliminating a 
large chunk of the motivation for transfer-pricing practice. The 
elimination of taxes on foreign-sourced income (as destined for foreign 
jurisdictions) and the exclusion of cross-border transactions would create 
a “super territorial system—one that ignores not only activities that 
occur abroad, but also those going and coming.”72 According to Professor 
Auerbach, such a system would no longer allow profit shifting “because 
such shifting would no longer be possible.”73 In Auerbach’s examples, the 
profit shifting methods employed, which either underreport sales to 
foreign subsidiaries or overstate interest on a loan from a related entity, 
have no impact upon the U.S. tax base because they are not included 
within the base and cannot be deducted against the base.74 Put 
differently, the consumption tax—based upon the destination principle—
simply does not include within its tax base the framework by which 
multinational companies currently move profits around. 
 
 69. Id. at 14. 
 70. Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., supra note 57, at 15. 
 71. Id. at 38–42. 
 72. Auerbach, supra note 19, at 10. 
 73. Id. This is in comparison to a simple territorial system, the de facto standard for most of the 
world, because companies can shift their activities to low tax countries. 
 74. Auerbach, supra note 19, at 11. 
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Comparatively, Rep. Camp’s proposal to include income from 
intellectual property under Subpart F taxation75 is one method that would 
prevent the hoarding of income aboard; controlled foreign corporations 
(“CFC”s) are taxed on certain items of income irrespective of whether 
they have actually made a dividend or repatriated the income.76 The 
United States seems to be leaning toward an expansion of CFC taxation 
rules, likely because that expansion would still be less significant than 
overhauling the entire tax code into a consumption tax—which would be 
a drastic endeavor, even if it only applied to corporations. Further, Rep. 
Camp’s legislative draft appears to be stuck in reform limbo, 
“presumably due in part to the challenging policy compromises that such 
legislation would necessarily involve,” along with other pending 
proposed reforms.77 
By contrast, the OECD’s reforms to combat profit shifting are 
progressing as other members begin to adopt principles within anti-profit 
sharing plans.78 As the international movement gains traction, it is 
possible that aspects of the OECD reform will become more attractive to 
tax reformers within the United States.79 Adopting a destination principle 
as part of a corporate tax reform, per Auerbach’s proposed method, does 
seem to be the most practical and straightforward way of combatting 
profit sharing. 
D. Taxation of Intellectual Property 
Finally, the destination principle would help the United States 
determine the appropriate way to tax intellectual property used abroad. 
The destination principle would closely mirror how the United States 
currently taxes royalties, while eliminating much of the corporate 
maneuvering in an efficient manner. 
Currently, the United States taxes the inventory sale of intellectual 
property depending upon whether the sale was within the United 
States.80 If the intellectual property is personal property, the property is 
 
 75. Subpart F taxation refers to sections 951–65 of the I.R.C., which tax a U.S. parent corporation 
on transfers of income between the parent’s corporate subsidiaries even if no income is ever repatriated 
to the United States. I.R.C. §§ 951–65 (West 2015). 
 76. Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International Competition, and 
the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 347, 370–71 (2013); see also I.R.C. 
§§ 951–65 for the statutory mechanism for taxing a corporation’s income that has not been repatriated. 
 77. Paul W. Oosterhuis & Moshe Spinowitz, US Corporate Tax Reform: Stuck in Neutral, 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.skadden.com/insights/us-
corporate-tax-reform-stuck-neutral. 
 78. James Anderson & Chris Hutley Hurst, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: Key UK Issues, 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.skadden.com/insights/base-
erosion-and-profit-shifting-key-uk-issues. 
 79. Oosterhuis & Spinowitz, supra note 77. 
 80. I.R.C. § 861 (West 2015). 
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sourced81 to the residence of the seller; if the seller is a U.S. resident or 
citizen, it is subject to U.S. tax.82 The United States taxes royalties from 
the licensing of intellectual property based upon where the property is 
intended to be used.83 If the property is to be used within the United 
States, it is deemed to be sourced from within the United States, and 
therefore is subject to taxation. 
Addressing intellectual property in any tax reform is necessary to 
prevent erosion of the tax base. Currently, U.S companies can establish 
foreign subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions and license the intellectual 
property to themselves. In a survey of how international companies game 
the current tax system, the Joint Committee on Taxation found: 
The [company] designated an entity in a low-tax jurisdiction as a 
“principal” and then transferred a significant portion of its IP to that 
principal. Once the IP had been transferred to the principal, the low-
tax jurisdiction taxed the IP income, even when the underlying R&D 
took place in a higher-tax country. The benefits of these kinds of transfers 
are enhanced whenever the principal pays an artificially low price for 
the higher-taxed entity’s IP.84 
Rep. Camp, previously mentioned in Part III.A, has proposed the use of 
a “patent box” that “would include controlled foreign corporations’ . . . 
worldwide income derived from intangibles.”85 The effectiveness of 
patent boxes, whether in stimulating technological growth or ensuring 
that some international revenue is taxed, is still unproven.86 Reform, 
however, is clearly necessary. Complex business planning schemes like 
the “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich” allow companies whose main 
product is intellectual property to “deflect IP income to low- or zero-tax 
countries even in circumstances where the value of the IP was created in 
the United States and the resulting products are sold in the United 
States.”87 
Unfortunately, the effectiveness of including income from intellectual 
property under Subpart F taxation is questionable. The requirements to 
 
 81. In international tax, “source” refers to the location where the item of income is determined to 
have arisen. This is important because, depending on where an item of income is sourced, it may or may 
not be included in a country’s tax base. For example, a country might “source” income from personal 
services to where the personal services were performed and only include personal services sourced 
within that country in the tax base—thus, a citizen of that country who performed personal services 
abroad would not include income from those services within her taxable income for that country. 
 82. I.R.C. § 865. 
 83. Id. § 861(a)(4). 
 84. Graetz & Doud, supra note 76, at 395. 
 85. Id. at 370–71 (citing H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 112th Cong., Technical Explanation of the 
Ways and Means Discussion Draft Provisions to Establish a Participation Exemption System for the 
Taxation of Foreign Income 34 (2011), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/final_te_--
_ways_and_means_participation_exemption_discussion_draft.pdf). 
 86. Id. at 375. 
 87. Id. at 400–01. For an introduction to the Double Irish Dutch Sandwich, see Stephen C. Loomis, 
The Double Irish Sandwich: Reforming Overseas Tax Havens, 43 St. Mary’s L.J. 825, 836–42 (2012). 
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be a CFC subject to tax are complicated and multifaceted.88 Merely 
including intellectual property within the scope of the current system 
would allow the current forms of corporate gamesmanship to continue 
unabated.89 
Adopting a destination principle in the switch to a consumption tax 
would be the most sensible approach in this area, if only for the problems 
that an origin principle would introduce. Under the origin principle, the 
jurisdiction taxes production within the jurisdiction and exports from the 
jurisdiction, while excluding imports into the jurisdiction.90 This scheme 
only emphasizes the threshold issue regarding intellectual property, that 
is, determining where that property is actually created. Unlike personal 
property or real property, which has a definite existence at a particular 
location, intellectual property is not tethered to a physical location and 
can be attributed to multiple factors that come together during the 
creative process. 
This is true even more so in the globalized economy. Multinational 
enterprises can fully utilize their expansive industry to create IP, but 
structure the arrangement so that the IP is “created” by a subsidiary in a 
low-tax country. While the origin principle might be attractive if the 
taxing jurisdiction is a net exporter, it simply fails to accommodate the 
complexities of “creation” for intellectual property.91 The destination 
principle is the preferable choice in terms of practicality: for products, 
wherever the good ends up is the destination; for services, the destination 
principle functions “as a proxy for the location of consumption” to solve 
controversies about where the services benefit.92 Just as for services, the 
destination principle is a sensible proxy for intellectual property. 
Consider the following example. Suppose that Corporation A 
produces a piece of computer software, the coding of which involved 
workers from Countries X and Y. Country X features a corporate tax 
rate of thirty-five percent, while Country Y has a rate of ten percent. 
Corporation A wants to license the use of the software in Country Z, 
which has a tax rate of fifteen percent. If Countries X, Y, and Z all base 
their tax systems upon the origin system, Corporation A will be 
incentivized to characterize the creation as taking place in Country Y, 
while Country X would argue that the creation occurred within Country 
X’s borders. However, if taxes in all three jurisdictions are based upon 
the destination principle, then the end result is simple: Z is the country 
that gets to tax the production. 
 
 88. See I.R.C. § 957. 
 89. See Graetz & Doud, supra note 76, at 417. 
 90. See Keen & Hellerstein, supra note 50, at 360. 
 91. Id. at 362. Of note, the United States has been a net importer in recent years. 
 92. Id. at 367. 
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One issue does remain, however, in determining when a piece of IP 
is destined for use in a particular area. The current system solves the 
issue by stating that the property must be actually used there for the 
income to be sourced there.93 Courts have had trouble distinguishing 
cases where a piece of intellectual property was used or consumed, rather 
than where it was produced or sold.94 However, even the IRS has held that 
“intellectual property is used at the place of consumption.”95 If courts 
were to follow the IRS’s viewpoint, they would effectively help create a 
more simplified and streamlined system for properly treating intellectual 
property. 
IV.  Criticism of the Destination Principle 
Not all proponents of a consumption tax uniformly support the 
destination principle. Some scholars have taken steps to illustrate that 
the differences between the destination principle and the origin principle 
are more dependent upon economic and scholarly models rather than 
upon reality.96 Two of the biggest criticisms are that the destination 
principle narrowly defines the tax base in a way that produces uncertain 
revenue results and that the origin principle is simply a preferable 
system. 
A. Uncertain Revenue Results 
One concern about implementing the destination principle is 
whether it would actually affect U.S. tax revenue. Revenue is not 
necessarily the most important aspect of any proposed tax reform, and 
there is no consensus about how tax policy should affect revenue.97 While 
some proposals are aimed at increasing revenue through tax reform, 
others aim to reform the tax system in a manner that simply leaves the 
current stream of revenue unaffected.98 
 
 93. Erin L. Guruli, International Taxation: Application of Source Rules to Income from Intangible 
Property, 5 Hous. Bus. & Tax L.J. 205, 221 (2005). 
 94. See generally Ferenc Molnar v. Comm’r, 156 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1946); see also Lawrence Lokken, 
The Sources of Income from International Uses and Dispositions of Intellectual Property, 36 Tax L. 
Rev. 235, 280 (1981). 
 95. Lokken, supra note 94, at 281; see generally Estate of Marton v. Comm’r, 47 B.T.A. 184 (1942). 
 96. See, e.g., Ben Lockwood et al., On the European Union VAT Proposals: The Superiority 
of Origin Over Destination Taxation (1994), available at http://people.exeter.ac.uk/gdmyles/papers/ 
pdfs/ECOANDD.pdf. 
 97. See Michael Mazerov, Ctr. on Budget and Pol’y Priorities, Academic Research Lacks 
Consensus on the Impact of State Tax Cuts on Economic Growth (June 17, 2013), www.cbpp.org/ 
cms/?fa=view&id=3975 (providing an example of this lack of consensus in a different tax context). 
 98. Business Investment and Innovation, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., http://www.finance.senate.gov/ 
issue/?id=72355fe8-b834-467e-bae8-79a77f7517f8 (last visited June 9, 2015) (admitting, however, that 
its internal membership cannot agree on goal for revenue); Oosterhuis & Spinowitz, supra note 77 
(discussing Sen. Baucus’s proposed reform and Camp’s reform—both claim to be revenue neutral). 
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It is important, however, to be able to estimate the effect of 
proposed reform on revenue flow. Switching to a destination principle 
that looks only to domestic transactions “is somewhat more difficult to 
assess in terms of revenue effects.”99 Initially, one struggles to see how 
excluding currently taxed items from a proposed tax base could increase 
revenue or keep revenue neutral. Indeed, Auerbach’s proposed “Modern 
Corporate Tax” requires the elimination or reduction of deductions 
related to foreign-source income and loss of FTCs to explain how 
revenue could actually increase.100 This approach would also involve 
exempting foreign dividends from U.S. taxation, and increasing tax 
revenue in Auerbach’s model only if the rest of his model is adopted as 
well.101 
While it is hard to completely predict how the destination principle 
would affect current revenues, there are some obvious insights. First, the 
Joint Committee on Taxation (“JCT”) has estimated that a switch to a 
territorial tax system, under the current income tax, would “increase 
revenues by about $32 billion from 2012 through 2016 and by $76 billion 
from 2012 through 2021.”102 This approach would involve exempting 
dividends abroad from the U.S. tax base and removing deductions 
allocable to foreign operations.103 The JCT’s study is not completely on 
point, as it still uses the current income tax as the background for its 
hypothetical move to a territorial system. However, its decision to 
remove deductions allocable to foreign operations does seem to bring it 
closer to the result of a destination-based consumption tax. 
Second, adopting a consumption tax with a destination principle 
would encourage domestic production if taxpayers were permitted to 
immediately deduct their expenditures for domestic production.104 
Foreign companies would no longer have a tax advantage to produce or 
manufacture abroad if they ultimately intended to distribute their goods 
within the United States.105 Thus, companies would be encouraged to 
keep or move their production into the United States, as they could then 
eliminate all taxation on their production costs, even if they intended to 
ship their goods abroad.106 Ideally, the increased production in the United 
States would lead to additional goods manufactured for U.S. 
consumption, which would generate tax revenue. Theoretically, the 
 
 99. Auerbach, supra note 19, at 12. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Cong. Budget Office, Options for Taxing U.S. Multinational Corporations 23 (2013), 
available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/43764 (citing Cong. Budget Office, Reducing the Deficit: 
Spending and Revenue Options (2011)). 
 103. Id. at 21–22. 
 104. See Barker, supra note 55, at 695–96; see also Auerbach, supra note 19, at 2. 
 105. See Barker, supra note 55, at 696. 
 106. Id. 
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increased consumption within the United States, along with disallowed 
FTCs and deductions for expenses related to foreign production, would 
help to increase domestic revenue, as reported by the CBO in 2013.107 
B. Merits of the Origin Principle 
One of the main issues with the destination principle is that it simply 
does not pick up the benefits the origin principle captures. The origin 
principle, logically, includes value created within the jurisdiction within 
the tax base.108 A company that operates within the jurisdiction will be 
taxed on what it produces, whether the goods are produced for use within 
the jurisdiction or for export.109 The origin principle helps generate 
consumption efficiency—consumers end up paying the same price in 
their residence jurisdiction, so they value those commodities similarly.110 
Simply put, there are some attractive qualities to the origin principle. 
The origin principle, however, fails to accommodate for the modern 
difficulties that plague international taxation. One of the biggest 
concerns is that the origin principle allows for the type of gamesmanship 
that multinational enterprises currently engage in by “[incentivizing] 
enterprises to establish transfer prices for their intermediate transactions 
so as to have value added appear to arise in low-VAT jurisdictions.”111 In 
other words, the origin principle allows for the continuation of “transfer 
pricing” within a consumption tax system. The same incentives do not 
exist within a system based upon the destination principle because the 
prices paid to foreign jurisdictions are excluded, and thus, companies are 
not able to benefit from gaming foreign prices.112 
Additionally, the United States is currently a net importer of goods, 
running a trade deficit (that is, the difference between imports and 
exports) of $39.1 billion, which is an overall increase.113 It could make 
sense for a country to adopt the origin principle if it is a net exporter 
because the value of those goods is still captured within its jurisdiction. 
However, it is more sensible for countries that are net importers to adopt 
the destination principle to ensure that more value is caught within its 
base. The President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform noted in its 
comments to adopting a consumption tax that utilizing the destination 
principle would generate about $775 billion more revenue over the 
 
 107. Cong. Budget Office, supra note 102, at 22. 
 108. See Barker, supra note 55, at 690. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Keen & Hellerstein, supra note 50, at 364. 
 111. Id. at 365. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Martin Crutsinger, US Trade Deficit Rose to $39.1 Billion in January, Associated Press, 
Mar. 7, 2014, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/us-trade-deficit-rose-391-billion-january. 
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course of the report’s timeframe.114 If implementing the destination 
principle ultimately turns the United States into a net exporter, then it 
would make more sense to switch to the origin principle. 
Conclusion 
The destination principle is the most practical solution to address 
U.S. taxation problems. Most of the United States’ major trading 
partners use a tax based upon the destination principle. Thus, adopting a 
similar system will facilitate a complementary taxation system between 
the United States and those partners while ensuring the least amount of 
double taxation upon U.S. businesses. The advantages of the destination 
principle, especially in terms of international competitiveness and in 
preventing tax base erosion, would be especially advantageous in 
creating a tax reform that receives broad support from multiple groups 
and parties. 
 
 114. President’s Advisory Panel on Fed. Tax Reform, Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals 
to Fix America’s Tax System 172 (2005). 
